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GERHARD THÜR 
THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIRNESS IN 
ATHENIAN LEGAL PROCEDURE 
Thoughts on the Echinos and Enklema * 
When two citizens of astate carry out their dispute in court, each 
one expects not to face discrimination at the outset. Any procedural 
code that has been generally accepted must account for organizational 
provisions which, on the one hand, ensure that the court can make a 
decision without external pressure or corruption, and on the other, 
bind the conduct of litigants and their associates to specific rules and 
regulations. One of these rules is the 'Neuerungsverbot', i.e. a prohibi-
tion on introducing new evidence. According to modem regulations on 
procedure, a court of appeals is only allowed to recognize evidence that 
was previously submitted by litigants to the trial court. In recent times, 
there has been discussion of a 'Neuerungsverbot' in effect even during 
the original trial as a way to prevent dragging out the case. Athenian 
litigation knew a similar 'Neuerungsverbot', undoubtedly for trials 
that passed through mandatory official arbitration (diaita).l At Athens, 
though, the concern was not with limiting the length of the case, but 
rather with protecting the litigants against surprise attacks by their op-
ponents during the main trial (which had a time limitation). Both rules 
are consistent with the notion that a principle of fairness governed the 
conduct of a trial. 
The organization of courts and procedures are highly dependent on 
their social surroundings. Judgments considered to be just can be de-
termined in a number of ways, and yet the objectivity of the court and 
• First published as: Das Prinzip der Fairness im attischen Prozess: Gedan-
ken zu Echinos und Enklema, in E. Cantarella (ed.) Symposion 2005. Akten der 
qesellschaft für Griechische und Hellenistische Rechtsgeschichte 19, Verlag der 
Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna 2007, pp. 131-150; 
translated by Jess Miner under revision of the author. 
1 Harrison (1971) 97, 102. 
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fairness for both litigants are timeless problems. For the legal historian, 
it is of interest to investigate the different ways in which these princi-
pIes were formed and how they are products of their time. 
For generations, trial law at classical Athens, which is weIl docu-
mented, has been researched from these angles. As a result, the Athe-
nian trial has been either revered as the paradigrn of democratic juris-
prudence, or vilified as the arbitrary rule of the easily-swayed, unedu-
cated masses.2 In this article, I would like to avoid this type of ideologi-
cally driven assessment, which is, in my opinion, dubious. It will prove 
intriguing enough to observe trial law at Athens within its historical 
setting. For this reason, we must then refrain from modem assurnp-
tions on legal establishments of the truth. In Athenian litigation, laws 
on evidence were affected by the democratic organization of the popu-
lar courts (dikasteria); and arising out of the details of evidentiary law 
1132 we will find some regulations on fairness, which governed the in-
teraction of the litigants. 
The effort of the AtheI}ians themselves to create equal opportunity 
for both litigants on their day in court is striking and has been investi-
gated thoroughly. The following provisions can be counted among the 
democratic regulations in effect for the day in court: equal distribution 
of jurors from all ten tribes of the citizenry on the day ofthe main trial; 
the distribution of seating in the dikasteria which were just then assem-
bled by lot; and the assignment of the dikasteria by lot to the court mag-
istrates sitting on that day as presiders. Up to the last moment then, no 
one knew which jurors would be deciding on which trials; corruption 
was therefore impossible. It was just as unlikely that factions (similar to 
the theater business today) could take their seats in groups and, 
through demonstrations of approval or disapproval, fire up the spirits 
of their fellow jurors for or against a litigant. This dangerous 'uproar' 
(thorubos) of the jurors and the role that group dynamics played in the 
trial will be discussed further below. It was through these measures as 
weIl as the meticulously organized secret ballot, that an objective ruling 
by the democratic popular courts was best assured. Another, quite 
simple, mechanism was conducive to establishing equal opportunity 
for litigants. For both the prosecutor and defendant, the exact same 
amount of time was measured out by a waterclock (klepsudra). All of 
these mechanisms are described in great detail in chapters 63-69 of the 
2 See Todd (1973) 91, with additional bibliography. 
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Athenaion Politeia and documented through archaeological evidence 
from the agora.3 
Yet the striet rules just mentioned, which govern the course of a 
trial at Athens, have little to do with ' fairness' . I will call these the 'ex-
ternal' framework for equal opportunity in court. Is there also an 'in-
ternal' framework that dictates the content of the speeches? It is here 
that we can speak of rules on 'fairness'. Anyone who is relatively well 
acquainted with the Athenian court speeches will immediately doubt 
that speakers were guided by any kind of principle of fairness. The 
main trial before the jurors was an agän, or battle of speeches. The liti-
gants and their co-speakers (sunegoroi) appear to have carried out their 
disputes like freestyle wrestlers; it seems as if every defamatory trick, 
every surprise attack were permissible. But, as is generally known, the 
Athenian trial did not just consist of the speeches and the vote in the di-
kasterion. In order to recognize the guiding principles, we must observe 
the entire process at least from the time that the suit was filed, but by 
rights, we should observe the entire private dispute happening before 
this point as well. The first precept of fairness to be recognized is that 
trials at the dikasteria ought to be avoided entirely. Any decent individ-
ual handled his private disagreements within his cirele of friends and 
relatives. It is virtually a topos to attack an opponent during a trial for 
having allowed private agreements 1133 to fall to ruins.4 Apart from this 
type of argument in court, an infringement on this precept of fairness 
did not result in any legal consequences. The 'spirit of conciliation' 
('Gütegedanke') certainly must be kept in mind for the remaining dis-
cussion of state-run procedure. 
When looking for the legal framework that governs the fair conduet 
of the litigants it is reasonable to begin with the filing of the suit or the 
accusation. Thus, the provision that the accuser had to summon the ac-
cused in front of witnesses, kleteres, need not be taken into considera-
tion.5 It proteeted the accused against adefault judgment that was 
wrongly issued, but it does not belong to the provisions that affeeted 
the content of the speeches. 
Without naming the principle of fairness direetly, in 1938 Franz 
Lämmli came elose to this theme with specific, philological questions. 
On the basis of Andokides 1 and Pseudo-Lysias 6, he sought to deter-
mine how a speaker reaeted in court to unforeseen evidence or argu-
3 Boegehold (1995); Thür (2000). 
4 Scafuro (1997) 69-75; Lanni (2005) 115f.; (2006) 48f. 
5 Harrison (1971) 85. 
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ments by his opponent, and to what degree the written version of the 
speech accounted for the arguments of an opponent that were heard for 
the first time in the dikasterion. This second question, which is a philol-
ogical one in the narrowest sense of the word, I wish to let rest here. It 
seems to me worthwhile only for speeches in which the speaker himself 
had a personal, political interest in publishing, as for instance the three 
speeches of Andokides or Demosthenes 18 and Aeschines 3. The major-
ity of private speeches, however, originate from the work of logogra-
phers. We can thus assume that they were published word-for-word, 
just as the speaker had memorized them and presented them before the 
court. In most cases, though, the documents that would have been read 
aloud in court have been lost. My assumption is that the original texts, 
in accordance with legal practice, appended at the end of the published 
speeches as a dossier of files recorded on wooden tablets. Unfortu-
nately, later rhetorical instruction lost interest in these by-products of 
trial procedure, which were considered 'artless' by these types of 
schools, but which hold great significance for the legal historian. As a 
result, by and large only the lemmata marturia, proklesis, or nomos are 
retained in a speech. At best, the lemmata are accompanied by texts of 
the documents from the dossier that was originally affixed, and in the 
worst case, by forgeries that have been reconstructed out of the text of 
the speech. These speeches written by logographers have something to 
tell us about the mIes of fairness. 
Lämmli has already asked rather dearly how the logographers, 
who devised speeches for their clients word-for-word in advance, 
could have known an opponent' s position, which would have been re-
vealed for the first time in the dikasterion. Which institutions ensured 
that the litigants 1) did not hopelessly speak at cross-purposes in court 
and 2) were not left totally j134 unprepared when suddenly confronted 
during the trial with accusations that were never previously voiced? 
Both of these problems are to some extent resolved satisfactorily within 
the Athenian system. 
The first question resolves itself through the litigants' own interest 
in proving or disputing the material demands of the suit that has been 
filed. It is a well-known fact that the opposing positions of the litigants 
did not collide for the first time in the main trial at the dikasterion, but 
rather were revealed in preliminary proceedings, which were con-
ducted by a court official or a state-appointed private individual, a se-
lected diaitetes. The prodikasiai fulfilled this role in murder trials, the of-
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fieial diaita in most private cases, and the anakrisis in the remaining pro-
cedures. Lämmli6 had determined that it was not the court offieial who 
questioned the litigants on the preliminary points of the trial in the ana-
krisis? Instead, the litigants questioned each other on topics that were 
relevant to their own arguments and provoked each other for state-
ments and concessions, and in this way they prepared their speeches 
before the dikasterion. As legal provisions, two la ws were enacted. One 
obligated the litigant to answer his opponent's questions (Dem. 46.10): 
"Both opponents are compelled to answer each other' s questions, but 
not to be a witness"8 A second law held the litigants to an affirmative 
response so that the one giving consent could no longer dispute the 
wording in court (Dem. 49.12): "the present homologiai (acknowledg-
ments), made by the litigants in front of witnesses, are definitive."9 I 
have already explained the likely procedural function of this 'law on 
homologiai' years ago. lO 
These preliminary proceedings can be viewed from two different 
perspectives. On the one hand, the substance of the trial is structured in 
such a way that the court has a basis for an objective ruling. On the 
other, the litigants could draw out supporting arguments for their up-
coming speeches through well-crafted questions. When we take the 
techniques and methods of conducting the trial into cortsideration, the 
game of question-and-answer in the preliminary trial stands in opposi-
tion to the comprehensive speeches delivered before the courts, which 
were, as we know, staffed with several hund red jurors. In short, we can 
speak of a ' rhetorical' segment of the trial, the main hearing, and a 'dia-
lectic' segment, the preliminary hearing.ll By supplementing the rhe-
torical segment where the judgment was delivered, with a dialectic 
segment that was necessary for preparation, p 35 the Athenians dearly 
intended to support fairness during the conduct of the trial. 
Thus far, the scholarship is in agreement. The points that I am 
about to make, however, will be highly controversial. In contrast to the 
6 Lämmli (1938) 83; see also Thür (1977) 76; (2005) 156. 
7 Also Wolff (1961), (1965) 2519f. 
8 Dem. 46,10: NOMO~. T oiv aVT1SiK01V ETravoYKEr dvol aTToKpfvoo801 aAAt;-
A01S TO epWTc.0IlEVOV, llapTvpeiv Se Iltl . . . ; see also Isai. 6,12. 
9 Dem. 42,12: ... aAA' ave' EVos Mo VOIlOVS TlKEl lTPOS vlläS lTapaßEßIlKc.0S, Eva 
IlEV TOV KEAevovTa TplWV rillepwv aep' J'is äv 011001) TrlV ovoiav alToepa(velv, ETepov 
Se TOV KEAevOVTa KUp(Or dvol TI!rr TTpOr aAArjAour Oj.JOAoY(Or, är äv EVOVTfov 
TTOlrjOG.JVTOI j.J0PTrJpG.JV. 
10 Thür (1977) 155. 
11 Thür (1977) 156, 313; (2005) 152. 
56 Gerhard Thür 
generally accepted view, I will attempt to demonstrate that fairness had 
such a far-reaching influence in Athenian litigation that the litigants 
had to present each other with their body of evidence in every pro ce-
dure, and deposit these into sealed clay containers (echinoi) regardless 
of whether the trial had to pass through an obligatory diaita or an ana-
krisis. Lastly, I wish to tie the principle of fairness together with a topic 
of more re cent interest: the 'relevance' of claims made during the trial. 
Irrelevant-ex6 tou pragmatos-was not what was beside the point le-
gally, but rather what the accuser did not explicitly list in his complaint, 
in his enklema or his graphe. 
In the scholarship on the first issue in question, the use of echinoi, 
the prevailing opinion is that the 'Neuerungsverbot' applied only to 
the private proceedings that were instituted by the Forty, four of whom 
were responsible for each tribe.12 The individual members of the Forty 
in charge, unlike the jurisdiction of the archons, did not conduct an 
anakrisis, but rather assigned a diaitetes to the litigants from a list of citi-
zens who had completed their 59th year. This 'official' -or better yet, 
'selected' -diaitetes performed the same function in terms of legal pro-
cedure as the court magistrate within the anakrisis. The diaita, neverthe-
less, was peculiar in that it ended with a suggested decision of the 
diaitetes, an apophasis. Because we never hear about thecontent of the 
decision given by the diaitetes, it must have consisted simply of a nota-
tion on the enklema, either supporting or rejecting the claim (much like 
the verdict of the court). The litigants could reconcile themselves (em-
menein, AP 53, 2) with the suggestion of the diaitetes, or just as after an 
anakrisis, they could enter into (ephienai) the rhetorical segment of the 
trial and after speech and counter-speech, let the dikasterion make the 
decision on their case. Should this latter situation occur, the diaitetes 
had to hand over a11 of the documentary material to the member of the 
Forty in charge, who was presiding over the dikasterion as the court 
magistrate. In a catalogue of offices, the Athenaion Politeia describes the 
procedure of the obligatory diaita within a section on the Forty. Here 
we learn of the provision that the litigants could only use documents in 
the dikasterion that had already been furnished to the diaitetes (AP 53, 
3).13 Did this 'Neuerungsverbot' apply only to proceedings before the 
diaitetes or also to a11 other court proceedings? 
12 Harrison (1971) 97. 
13 AP 53, 2-3: ... oi öe napaAa[36vTES, [e]av ~i] öVvwvTal ölaAVoal, YIYVWO-
KOVOI, Käv ~ev a~q>oTEpOIS apEOKl] Ta yvwo8EvTa Kai EIlf.JlVc.;OIV, exel TEAOS Ti ÖIKT]. 
äv ö' 6 eTepos eq>ij TWV aVTIÖIKWV eis TC ölKaoTTiplov, e~[3aA6vTes TaS ~apTvplas 
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j136 Before the discovery of the Athenaion Politeia the answer was 
seemingly dear. According to Meier-Schömann, all documents to be 
read aloud before the dilcasterion had to be submitted be forehand in 
both the anakrisis and the diaita.14 The opinion that the echinoi men-
tioned in the Athenaion Politeia would have been used only in the pre-
trial before the diaitetes, but not in the anakrisis, goes all the way back to 
Bonner.15 Thus there would not have been a 'Neuerungsverbot' in ana-
krisis procedures. This view has prevailed until now even though in 
1982 archaeological evidence for just such a document container from 
the 4th/3rd century B.C. was finally published. The evidence consists of a 
lid to a day pot with the inscription: " ... ex anakriseös .. . "16 This discovery, 
nonetheless, has not yet led to areevaluation of the standard view.J7 In 
Symposion 1997, Wallace for example writes, " ... use of the echinos in ana-
kris eis was intended only as a way of preserving documents vital to the 
case."18 It is therefore time for a critical reassessment of Bonner's view 
from 1905. Sedes materiae is, nonetheless, not Bonner but Lämmli. In a 
chapter entitled "Die Bedeutung der anakrisis im attischen Rechtsver-
fahren"19 from his 1938 study mentioned above, Lämmli carefully han-
dled all of the sources that supposedly proved Bonner' s thesis. Despite 
great skepticism and substantial counterarguments, Lämmli comes to 
the condusion that the 'Neuerungsverbot' did not apply to the anakrisis 
procedures. This is wrong. 
Before I go into the sources, I must first address the assumptions 
that guided these authors' approaches to Athenian triallaw. The jurist 
calls this foundational conception 'dogmatics.' In jurisprudence, dog-
matics does not imply a system of doctrine, but rather principles found 
through inductive reasoning to better und erstand a legal system. The 
obligatory diaita is a good example of this. Until now, the view was 
maintained that the selected diaitetes would decide the trial of first in-
Kai TCxS lTpoKAf]aelS Kai TOIlS VOIlOUS eis EXfIlOVf, Xc.upiS lleV TCxS TOV ÖIWKOVTOS, 
Xc.upiS öe TCxS TOV <pevyoVTos, Kai TOVTOUS KaTaOTJIlT]ValleVOI, Kai Ti]V yvwalv TOV 
ÖlaITT]TOV yeypalllltvTw EV ypallllaTe[~ lTpOaapTf]aavTES, lTapaÖIÖoaOl TO[i]S 
Ö'ToiS Ti]V <puAi]v TOV <peVyovTos öIKal;ouOIv. (3) oi öe lTapaAaßovTes eiaayoualv 
eis TC öIKaaTf]plov, ... OVK E~EClTI ö' OUTE 1I0JiOIf OUTE rrpoKJ.rlClEClI OUTE JiapTVpfalf 
aAA ' ;; Tai) rrapa TO'; ÖlaITTJTO'; xpi'jCl8al Tai) Eif TOVf EXfllOVf EJißEßATJJiEllalf. 
14 Meier/Schömann (1883-87) 867. 
15 Bonner (1905) 48; see also (1930) 284. 
16 Boegehold (1982); on this point, see below nn. 77-87 with text. 
17 Todd (1973) 129 is at least skeptical. 
18 Wallace (2001) 98. 
19 Lämmli (1938) 74-128. 
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stance and the dikasterion would function as the court of appeals after 
the ephienai of the losing party.20 Steinwenter had already shown in 
1925 that we cannot speak of an 'appeal ' but rather of the resorting to 
the court, which has exclusive jurisdiction, after a simple attempt at an 
amicable agreement through the diaitetes.21 The battle over the modern 
description of ephesis and its dogmatic classification might appear as 
mere quibbling but it has consequences that are not always apparent to 
philologists. jt37 From the modern perspective, it seems completely un-
derstandable that a 'Neuerungsverbot' must have been in place for an 
appeals process, thus presumably for diaita procedures, but not for pro-
cedures that took place after a preliminary anakrisis, since these would 
have been decided as a trial of single instance.22 Lämmli voiced concern 
about this conclusion in consideration of Steinwenter's findings.23 The 
need to protect the litigants from new pieces of evidence being intro-
duced unexpectedly (what I call 'fairness') would have existed equally 
in both types of procedures. Indeed, even according to Lämmli, the 
sources allow for no other conclusion.24 Lämmli supported his argu-
ments with a highly forced, dogmatic classification of the anakrisis,25 a 
point that I do not wish to explore any further. Let us now turn to the 
sources. 
The conclusion from silence that echinoi were mentioned in 
connection with the diaita but never together with the anakrisis is over-
turned by the inscription on the clay lido Under these circumstances, 
the fact that some lexica26 do not make this same restriction to the diaita 
can at least serve as a supporting argument. More important are the al-
legedly positive testimonia that a litigant could have presented new 
evidence to the dikasterion after the anakrisis. Once again, we must clear 
up a persistent misunderstanding. A 'Neuerungsverbot' controlled by 
echinoi can, of course, only be valid for written records, which were read 
out by the clerk to the court. For this reason, the physical demonstra-
tion of the supposedly dead slave girl in a murder trial (Isokr. 18, 52)-
classified by Bonner as 'real evidence' -is irrelevant for our subject, 
20 E.g. MacDowell (1978) 209. 
21 Steinwenter (1925) 68-74. 
22 Bonner (see above n. 15). 
23 Lämrnli (1938) 92f. 
24 Lämrnli (1938) 94. 
25 Lämrnli (1938) 88f. 
26 Harpokration, Lex. Seg. s.v. echinos; for further attestations, see Boegehold 
(1995) 222-226. 
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just like the offer to interrogate slaves under torture before the eyes of 
the jurors (Aisch. 2, 126). The 'Neuerungsverbot' at Athens did not per-
tain to everything that we would include as 'evidence, ' rather only to 
documents. The virtual staged performance and rhetorical tricks just 
mentioned could not have been prevented by the echinoi. 
In the realm of rhetorical devices, Lämmli has already made refer-
ence to instances of exomosia allegedly performed for the first time be-
fore the court (Isai. 9, 18; Dem. 19, 176; 58, 7; 59, 28. 84; Aisch. I, 45. 68; 
Isai. 2, 33; 8, 42; Dem. 47, 14).27 He is on the right track when claiming 
that the corresponding written records were already presented during 
the anakrisis.28 Likewise, a number of other rhetorical tricks can easily 
be connected to evidence which either was already presented or should 
have been presented: the feigned ignorance of opposing evidence (Isa i. 
9, 9; 1138 Isokr. 17, 38); the challenge put to an opponent to submit spe-
cific evidence (a slight variation is that the judges in the diaita pro ce-
dures were called upon to demand specific evidence);29 the offer to in-
troduce further evidence to the judges or, a trope stemming from sune-
goria, to vouch for one's own assertions as a witness (Dem. 19, 176). We 
cannot agree with Lämmli that these tricks only worked if new evi-
dence would have been permissible in the main trial,3° One always can 
operate on the premise that the path of documentary evidence only 
passed through the anakrisis before the main trial. 
The rhetorical tricks just mentioned, therefore, do not constitute a 
strong argument either for or against either side. Nor are the two pas-
sages relevant, which do not come from the court speeches, but, accord-
ing to Lämmli, argue for the introduction of new evidence into the 
main trial. Plutarch refers to a political trial against Kallias, in which he 
allowed his impoverished cousin Aristeides to give confirrnation ex 
tempore as a witness that he had voluntarily foregone assistance (Plut. 
Aristeides 25).31 Important procedural details should not be extracted 
27 Lärnmli (1938) 100. 
28 Likewise Thür (2005) 167-169. 
29 Lämmli (1938) 103. 
30 Lämmli (1938) 103. 
31 Piut. Aristeid. 25: '0 Oe KOAAIOS opwv bTi TOVTCt> ~aAloTo fJopußoiJvTa5' TOUS 
OIKOOTOS Koi XOAeTIWS TTPOS OUTOV exovTos, EKaAEI TOV ÄP10TEIOllV, a~lwv 
J.[apTl/pt;oal TTPOS TOUS olKooTas, ÖTI TToAAaKIS O\/ToO TTOAAo Koi BloovTos Koi 
BEo~evov AoßEIV OVK iJ8eAlloEv, aTToKplva~Evos ws ~aAAov OVTC~ BIO TTEVIOV ~eyo 
q>POVEIV ij KOAAI~ BIO TTAoOTOV TTpOmlKEI· .. . TOOTO TOO ÄPIOTelOOV TC;> KOAAI~ 
TTpooJ.[apTl/prjoavTo5', oVOEis Tjv TWV aKovoavTcuv ÖS OVK aTT~El TTevllS ~aAAov ws 
ÄploTEiBllS ETvOI ßOVM~EVOS ij TTAoVTEIV WS KoAAioS. 
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from later sources: does this case technically deal with a witness testi-
mony, a supporting speech (sunegoria),32 or an interjection, wh ich falls 
into the realm of virtual staging? At any rate, the "theft of a deposi-
tion," suggested by Anaximenes (Rhet. Alex. 15, 7f., 1432a), belongs to 
this latter category: "Testify for me Kallikles; by the Gods, it was not 
I - I tried to stop hirn as he did the deed."33 The fact that Kallikles 
would be safe from a dike pseudomarturiän by this outcry should not be 
attributed to the sophistic content of an alleged witness testimony. 
Rather, as is indicated by the concluding statement, it can be attributed 
to the fact that we are dealing with a staged act of disruption and not a 
marturia submitted in written form and properly deposited during the 
pre-trial. 
The six speeches from the Demosthenic corpus that Lämmli ad-
duced as direct evidence for the use of new evidentiary material in 1139 
anakrisis trials require a somewhat more detailed argument: Dem. 53, 
17; 34, 46; 29, 28; 43, 47; 59, 5 and 37, 45.34 In my opinion, these passages 
are either inconclusive or they prove the exact opposite. 
Two speeches deal with graphai; 
1.) In the speech against Nikostratos (Dem. 53), Apollodoros speaks 
of a graphe pseudokIeteias that was previously brought against Are-
thousios. During and after the anakrisis, Arethousios inflicted damages 
on Apollodoros, which, nevertheless, could not forestall Apollodoros 
from eventually winning the trial (Dem. 53, 15-18). For our purposes, 
the differing account of the two incidents in question is significant.35 In 
32 Despite the term (pros)marturein, such moralizing claims about poverty 
and wealth made in court most likely come from a sunegoros speech, see Thür 
(2005) 152-155; Lämmli (1938) 107 argues for a witness deposition. 
33 Rhet. Ad Alex. 15,7-8: ... EOTI SE KaI KAElTTEIV nlV llapTuplav TPOlT~ TOIQSE· 
llapTVpT]OOV 1l01, W KaAAIKAEIS' 110 TOVS 8EOVS OVKOUV eYCUYE· KcuMoVTOS yop EIlOÜ 
TaÜTa ElTpa~EV oihos. Kai 510 TOVTOU EV cllTO<pclOEI IjJEVSollapTupf)oas 
IjJEuSollaTuplou SIKT]V oUX u<pe~EI . (8) TOlyapoüv öTav IlEV f)lliv OUIl<pEplJ KAelTTEIV 
Tilv llapTUplav, OVTCUS aVTij XPTlOOIlE8a' EOV Se oi EvaVTIOI TOIOÜTOV TI lTOIf)OCUOlV, 
EIl<paVIOÜIlEV Tilv KaKOlTOllaV aUTwv Kai oUYYPO'f'OJ.lEIIOUr J.lOprupElIlKEAEVOOIlEV. 
34 Lämmli (1938) 99, 117, 121. 
35 Dem. 53, 16-17: ... ws Se TOVTOU SIf)llapTov, Kai EYW J.laprupor J.lEII c:iv {-
TTOOXOIl ETTOlor/J.lTllI, aUTOS SE ouSEv E~Tl!lcipTaVOv EiS aUTOvs, EVTaü8a ijST] !l01 
ElTIßouAEVOUOI Tilv !lEYIOTT]V ElTIßouAf)v' (17) aIlOKEKplJ.lEIIOU yop ijSTl !lOU KaT' 
aUTOÜ Tilv Tiis IjJEVSOKAT]TElas ypa<pi]v Kai lleAAovToS EiOieval Eis TO SIKaoTf)plov, 
TTJpf)oas IlE clvlovTa EK nElpalWS oljJe mpi TOS AI80TOlllas lTalEI TE nV~ Kai aplTci~EI 
IlEOOV Kai Ec.08EI IlE Eis TOS A180TOlllas, Ei !lf) TIVES lTPOOlOVTES, ßOWVTOS 1l0U 
clKovoavTES, lTapEyevovTo Kai Eßof)8T]oav. illlEpalS Se ou lToAAais VOTEPOV Ei-
OEAewv Eis TO SIKaoTf)plov lTPOS Ti!lEpaV Sla!lEIlETpT]IlEVT]V, Kai EfdEyfor aUTov TO 
IjJEuSii KEKAT]TEVKOTa Kai TO äAAa öoa E'ipTlKa i]SIKT]KOTa, ETAov. 
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section 16, Apollodoros summoned witnesses to an attack on his rose-
beds that was perpetrated during the anakrisis. And yet after the anakri-
sis, shortly before the main trial, when he was nearly tossed down into 
a stone quarry (17), he does not describe his rescuers as martures. The 
word exelenxas (17), which is used in reference to the main charge, the 
dike pseudokleteias, does not lead to the conclusion that a deposition on a 
subsidiary topic could be subsequently furnished as evidence. 
2.) In the first part of the speech against Neaira (Dem. 59), Theom-
nestos mentions a graphe paranomön, which Stephanos brought and won 
against a proposal put forth by Apollodoros (5). The fact that Theom-
nestos, a supporter of Apollodoros, attributes his opponent' s victory 
entirely to calumny, false witness, and accusations falling outside the 
scope of the charge, ofters us no evidence of depositions brought forth 
subsequently.36 
The rest of the passages come from private cases that have passed 
through an anakrisis. 
3.) I cannot unravel the complicated argumentation of the speech 
against Phormion here (Dem. 34),37 but it is clear that the ship captain 
Lampis, a key figure of the trial, was not available as a witness at the 
time. In section 11, the speaker has witnesses testifying to Lampis' re-
sponse to a question earlier posed in front of these witnesses; in section 
46, he speaks of an opposing testimony given by p40 Lampis that Phor-
mion had confirmed by a third party.38 The speaker complained that 
he, for this reason, could not attack Lampis' testimony with a dike pseu-
domarturiön; but this is false because the deposition was given in an ek-
marturia (cf. Dem. 46, 7). In this regard, the following words are rele-
36 Dem 59, 5: ... ypaljlcq.leVOS yap TTapavo~wv TO 'I"'1<plo~a LTe<pavos OlITOoI 
Kai eioeAet:Jv eis TO olKaoTTiplov, ETTI olaßoAij ljIevoeis ~apTvpas TTapaaxo~evos t:Js 
w<pAe TC;> orwoolcp EK TTeVTE Kai e'lKOOIV ETWV, Kai l{ev Tt]f yparpt]f 7T0AAa 
KaTTJyopGJII, eTAe TO 'I"'1<plo~a . Lämmli (1938) 121 is wrong here. 
37 On this speech, see Wolff (1966) 63-74, especially 69. 
38 Dem. 34,11: AVTos ~EV TOlvvv 6 Aa~TTlS , ~ <PIlOlV cmooeowKeval TO XPvolov 
(TOIhcp yap TTpOOExeTE TOV VOVV), TTpooeAeoVTos aVTc;> E~OV, ETrEIOf) TaXIOTa 
KaTETTAevoev EK Tiis vavaYlas ÄBTival;e, Kai EPWTWVTOS VTTep TOlhwv, eAeyev ÖTI 
oiiTe Ta xpTi~aTa ev8olTo eis Tf)V vavv OIhos KaTa Tf)V avyypa<pTiv, oilTe TO 
Xpvolov eiAIl<pt:Js e'lll TTap' aVTov EV BOOTTOPCP TOTE. Kai ~Ol avayvw81 Tf)V 
~apTvplav TWV TTapayevo~EvwV. MAPTYPIA. 
§ 46: ... Eyt:J O'OVK EXW Tl xpTiow~al ToiS To\hov J.uiprvolll, 01' rpaolll E/8fllal 
TOll AaJ./7TI11 J./aprvpouIITa a7TEIATlqJEllai TO Xpuofoll. ei IlEV yap Ti llapTVpla Ti TOV 
Aa~TTloos KaTeßaAAeTo EVTav8a, 'IOevS äv e<paoav OUTOI OIKalOV eTval 
ETTloKDTTTea8alll' EKelvcp' VVV o'oiiTe Tf)V l-lapTvplav TavTllv exw, oVTool TE o'lETal 
oeiv a8C;>os eTval ovoev ßeßalov EVEXVPOV KaTaAmt:Jv WV TrEIBel vl-läS 1jJIl<pIl;eo8al. 
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vant (46): " If the testimony of Lampis was brought forth here before 
the court, ... " The speaker thus makes it clear that Phormion-instead 
of an ekmarturia of the absent Lampis-ought to have filed and pre-
sen ted a marturia for the absent man. Therefore, whether adeposition 
from Lampis could have been introduced for the first time in the main 
triaP9 is not the point. 
The next three passages share something in common; as a rhetorical 
tapos, the speakers maintain that their opponents took them by sur-
prise. The informative value of these passages should therefore not be 
placed much higher than the rhetorical tricks discussed above. 
4.) In speech 29, Demosthenes defends his witness Phanos, who 
was brought forth in a guardianship case, against a dike pseudomarturion 
by Aphobos. A11egedly Demosthenes had not foreseen that Aphobos, in 
his prosecution speech, would introduce depositions regarding guardi-
anship accounts that had already been decided. For this reason, 
Demosthenes did not at this time have any witnesses on hand (27).40 
Lämmli acknowledged that Demosthenes' surprise must have been an 
act, since in every trial dealing with witness testimony arguments from 
the prior trial were introduced; but if a11 evidence had to have been dis-
closed before the present hearin& Demosthenes certainly could not 
have gotten away with this trick.41 In reality, a lot more would have 
been expected of the jurors. In section 39, Demosthenes introduces pre-
cisely those witnesses whom he supposedly p41 had not prepared.42 
The two remaining passages will also show that the rhetorical trick 
of feigned or a11eged surprise does not justify any conclusions on mat-
ters of legal procedure. 
5.) In the speech against Makartatos (Dem. 43), Sositheos attempts 
to substantiate Eubilides' rightful claim to the estate of Hagnias with an 
unusua11y large number of testimonies (43, 31-46). At the end of this 
section, Sositheos apologizes to the jurors for this exceptional quantity 
39 As Lärnmli (1938) 77,117 argues. 
40 Dem. 29, 28: ... OtlTOS ~EV yap ~O:PTVPOS IjIEVOEiS lTOpeaKEVooTOI mpl TOV-
TWV, ovYXOPllYoV EXWV 'OV';TOPO TOV KTJOEOTTW Kol TI~OKPO:TT]V' ';~Eis 0' ouxi 
rrpoEISoTEf, aAA' ll1TEP otlTlis TijS ~opTvpios ';YOV~EVOI TOV aywv' EOEOSOI , TOIlS 
mpl TWV EK TijS ElTITPOlTijS XPTJ~O:TWV JjapTllpaf ou rrapEoKwaoJjE8a viiv. ö~WS oe, 
Koimp OliTWS TOVTOV OEooq>lo~evov, Ta lTPO:Y~OT' OtlTa OIE~IWV oT~OI pc;toiws v~iv 
ElTIOei~EIV OIKOIOTOT' avSpc.:mwv TOVTOV wq>AllKOTO nlV oiKTJv, ... 
41 Lämmli (1938) 121. 
42 Dem. 29, 39: ... lTEpl Toivvv lTO:VTWV TOVTWV, lTPWTOV ~EV lTEpl TijS lTPOIKOS, 
ETS ' VlTEP WV KOSVq>EiKEV, ETS' VlTEP TWV äAAwv, avoyvwoETOI TOIlS TE vo~OVS Kol 
Tas ~opTvpioS, 'IV' EioijTE. NOMOI. MAPTYPIAI. 
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of depositions on the grounds that his party lost a previous trial over 
the estate because of being 'unprepared' (aparaskeuoi) (47).43 Again, we 
cannot draw any conclusions about the perrnissibility or impermissi-
bility of new evidence from the rhetorical trope of explaining that a de-
feat was suffered because of a surprise.44 Even if all the evidence is out 
in the open, a cleverly devised speech can achieve effects of the unex-
pected. 
6.) The best example of this phenomenon is a section of the speech 
against Paintainetos (Dem. 37), which Lämmli viewed in isolation.45 
Nikoboulos, the speaker, rnentions that Paintainetos had just won on 
the same issue with a dike metallike against Euergos, because Pantaine-
tos had surprised him with unforeseen accusations (47), such as mis-
treatment of heiresses, and had brought forth the corresponding laws.46 
The allegations, however, could not have been such a great surprise. In 
sections 22-33, Nikoboulos had already cited in great detail the com-
plaint that Pantainetos filed against him, which corresponded to the 
one filed against Euergos. Even jJ42 the accusation of effrontery against 
heiresses is included (33).47 Thus, it is likely that Pantainetos had al-
43 Dem. 43, 47: ÄvayvcilvOI IlEV Tas llapTvplas TavTas E~ O:VO:YKTlS T'jv, w äv-
opes olKaaTal, Iva Ilf) TO aUTO lT0:601ilev ömp TO lTponpov, aTTapaoKEVol A,,!p-
8ivTEfi11TO TOVTWV. 
44 Contra Lämmli (1938) 12l. 
45 Lämmli (1938) 12lf. 
46 Dem. 37, 45-47: BovAollal 0' ulliv Kai 01' WV TOUS lTponpov olKaaTas E~a­
lTaTTlaas eTAe TOV Eüepyov eimiv, IV' eiOi'j6 ' ÖTI Kai VUV Ouoev oih' o:valoelas oiITe 
TOU ljJevoea6al lTapaAelljJel . lTPOS Oe TOVTOIS Kai mpl WV Ellol OIKO:~eTal VVVI, TaS 
aUTas oüaas O:lToAoYlas eUpTlaeTe· öamp EAeyxos O:Kpl[3EOTaTos EaTIV UlTep TOU 
TOT'EKeivov aeavKoq>avTi'ja6al. oihoS yap DTlaaaT' EKeivov lTPOS älTam ToiS 
äAAolS EAeOVT' eis o:ypov ws aUTov ElTl TaS ElTIKATlPOVS eiaeAeeiv Kai Tf)V IlTlTepa 
Tf)V aUTOU, Kai TOUS VOIlOVS T'jKev EXWV TOUS Tcilv ElTIKATlPwV lTPOS TO OIKaaTTlPlov. 
(46) Kai lTPOS IlEV TOV äpXOVTa , ÖV Tcilv TOIOVTWV oi VOIlOI KeAevovalV ElTIlleAeia6al, 
Kai lTap' ~ T4J IlEV T'jOII<T]KOTI KIVOVVOS mpl TOU TI XPf) lTa6eiv il O:lToTeiaal , T4J 0' 
Em~lovTI lleT' ouoelllclS ~Tlll(as Ti [30Tl6ela , OUOElTW Kai TTlllepOV E~TlTaaTal, OUo' 
eiafJyyelAev OÜT' Eil' oiITe TOV Eüepyov ws O:OIKouvTas, EV oe T4J OIKaaTflPI'-!> TaUTa 
KaTTlyopel Kai ol/oTv TaAavTolv eTAe O(KTlV. (47) T'jv yap oTllal KaTa Ilev TOUS VOIlOVS 
TTpoElo6Ta TrlV aiTfav, Eq>' D KpIVeTal , p~OIOV TO:ATl6i'j Kai Ta OIKOI ' ElTIOel~aVT' 
O:lToq>evyelv, EV oe lleTaAAIKij OIK':1 , mpl WV OUo' äv ijAlTIaev aUTOU KaTTlYOPTl6Tl-
aea6al, xaAmov lTapaxpi'jIl' ExelV O:lToMaaa6al Tf)V ola[3oATlv· Ti 0' opyl') <Ti> 
lTapa Tcilv E~TllTaTTllleVWV UlTO TOUTOV olKaaTcilv, Eq>' ~ Tf)V 'l'iiq>OV eTxov 
lTpO:YllaTI , TOVTOV Kan'l'Tlq>(aaTO. 
47 Dem. 37, 33: ErKI\HMA. 'EvTav61 lToH' äTTa Kai oelva 1101 Öll' EYKaAei· Kai 
yap a 'iKelav Kai Ü[3PIV Kai [3lalwv Kai lTPOS ElTIKATlPovs O:OIt<rillaTa. TOVTWV 0' eialv 
EKO:OTOV xwplS ai OIKal Kai OÜTe lTPOS O:PXf)V Ti)v auTi)v oü6' UlTEP TlllTlllaTWV Tcilv 
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ready submitted the law on heiresses during the anakrisis. It is entirely 
feasible, although in no way proven by Nikoboulos' bold assertion (47), 
that at that time Pantainetos succeeded in infuriating the jurors with ir-
relevant arguments against Euergos, even if he could have foreseen 
them from the enklema and the la ws that were submitted as evidence. 
Nikoboulos capitalizes here on his position as the first speaker in a 
paragraphe trial in order to invalidate these arguments in advance. 
Our overview of the concrete examples collected by Lämmli, which 
constitute the alleged submission of new evidence in anakrisis trials, has 
now reached its condusion. There is not a single instance in which he 
has proved that a litigant made use of a document in the main trial that 
had not already been submitted during the anakrisis. Even if the 
'Neuerungsverbot' has by chance only been preserved in the literature 
for diaitetes trials, once we take into consideration the recently pub-
lished echinos inscription and the structural similarity of the anakrisis 
and obligatory diaita, there is no doubt that the prohibition on new evi-
dence, by the principle fairness, was equally valid for both procedures. 
With that, we have arrived once again at the 'dogmatics' of Athe-
man litigation. From this perspective, yet another widespread miscon-
ception douding our understanding of the 'Neuerungsverbot' needs to 
be dispelled. Here I can keep it brief. For Lämmli it was dear that a 
'Neuerungsverbot' at Athens could have only been valid for the sub-
mission of documents, and therefore, only from the time when evidence 
was submitted in written form. A verbal testimony by a witness could 
not be restricted.48 For hirn, the implementation of the mandatory 
diaita,49 the written deposition,50 and the echinoi was undoubtedly re-
lated to the 'Neuerungsverbot' . This is, however, not necessarily the 
case. I have elsewhere demonstrated that the earlier, verbal testimony, 
and the later, written one employ the same formula.51 In both instances, 
the witness simply affirms a statement formulated by one of the liti-
gants, just as if he were taking an oath. And in murder trials, the wit-
ness, from the earliest time on, in fact had to bind this statement with a 
solemn oath on the guilt or innocence of the accused during the prodi-
alITWV, aAA' r1IlEV a'lKEla Kai Ta TWV ßlatc.uv lTPOS TOVS TETTapOKOVTa, ai OE Tfis 
iißPEc.uS lTPOS TOVS 8ecrllo8ETas, öcra 0' Eis ElTIKAllPOVS, lTPOS TOV ÖpXOVTa. 
48 Lämmli (1938) 111. 
49 403-40lB.C., Lämmli (1938) 111; preferable is 399/98 B.C., Scafuro (1997) 
126,392. 
50 389 B.C. at the earliest, Lämmli (1938) 119; cf. Rubinstein (2000) 72. 
51 Thür (2005) 154f. 
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kasiai. Thus, a surprise attack by way of new testimonies during the 
main trial was precluded.52 We can envision the oral deposition in the 
anakrisis as right in line with the prodikasiai, only without the solemn 1143 
oath; the litigants would have to have revealed to one another the indi-
vidual witness or witnesses and the formula of the verbally delivered 
testimony or testimonies. With the arrival of the written form, the struc-
tural nature of the testimony had not been transformed, rather, only the 
medium for transmittance-from the anakrisis to the main trial, and 
from the main trial if necessary to the trial for false witness. Testimo-
nies in the form of written documents only eliminate arguments about 
the exact wording of the deposition formula. Once we acknowledge 
that there was an identical formulation for both the verbal and written 
testimony, we arrive at an important conclusion: from the earliest of 
times, the Athenian trial had already recognized the principle of fair-
ness. 
From where, then, does the peculiarity of diaitetes trials originate? 
Basically in the year 399/8, the pretrials from private cases that had 
piled up since 404 were handed over to 60 year-old citizens. The bulk of 
the trials needed to be amicably resolved without having to employ the 
expensive dikasteria. Thus, quasi-official authorities were designated as 
"arbitrators" (diaitetai) who then proposed a settlement, the apophasis, 
which did not in fact cut off the path to the dikasterion for either party. 
Possibly, the written form of the testimony emerged from the obliga-
tory diaita. For the first time, it was not the magistrate presiding over 
the dikasterion, one of the Forty, who conducted the pre-trial, but rather 
a private individual selected by lot. In these instances, the court magis-
trate could no longer ensure that the same formulation was used for the 
testimony delivered before the pretrial and the main trial. Written 
documents, protected within sealed echinoi, just as those already used 
for private documents in the 5th century,53 provided the technical solu-
tion to the problem. Soon the written testimony and the echinoi were in 
fact no longer restricted to the diaita trials. The new method of docu-
mentation corresponded with the meticulous regulation of the trial un-
der the Athenian democracy of the 4th century. Neither the formula of 
the testimony nor the 'Neuerungsverbot' were affected by the intro-
duction of the written form. 
Up to this point, I have handled two technical elements of pro ce-
dure, which protect the litigants from unforeseeable attacks during the 
52 As recognized by Lämmli (1938) 106. 
53 Boegehold (1995) 79f. 
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main trial in accordance with the rule of fairness: 1) The compulsory 
question and answer process, after which an opponent could no long 
dispute a concession (homologia) made in front of witnesses and 2) the 
'Neuerungsverbot' which was in existence from as far back as we know 
and which was safeguarded through the mechanisms that developed 
out of the diaitetes trial: written documentation and the echinoi. One last 
element remains to be addressed. It is one that Lämmli recognized,54 
but until now has been pushed aside. It goes without saying that the 
accused learned the position of his accuser from the written complaint, 
the graphe or enklema, and the accuser, conversely, that of the accused 
through the antigraphe. 1144 Are these documents also conducive to fair-
ness? 00 they too protect against unforeseen attacks? 
Very few written complaints have survived with their wording in 
tact. Harrison lists five examples.55 I would like to add two more. The 
most detailed ex am pie is Nikoboulos' citation of the enklema that Pan-
tainetos submitted in a dike blabes (Dem. 37, 22-33). At first glance, the 
colorful array of attacks appears, in terms of the law, to be just as un-
disciplined as the content of many speeches. Lanni gives a very good 
explanation of these findings in the speeches based on the non-
professional nature of Athenian popular courts; the legal establishment 
of the truth at Athens included recognition of a litigant' sentire charac-
ter.56 One component, however, has escaped Lanni's notice: a regula-
tion that kept the subjective personal attacks of an accuser in check and 
that upheld fairness in a trial. This regulation, in my opinion, directly 
relates to the written complaint. A clause in the jurors' oath reads 
(Dem. 24, 151): " .. .I will vote in accordance with the charge ... "57 Con-
sequently the litigants, after the case was called, swore before the jurors 
"to keep to the point" (AP 67, 1).58 
54 Lämmli (1938) 11. 
55 Harrison (1971) 9lf. 
56 Lanni (2005) 121-123, (2006) 59-64. 
57 Dem. 24, 149-151: OPK02 HI\IA2TON. 't'n<plov~al KaTa TOIlS v6~ovS Kai 
Ta ljIIl<picr~aTa TOV ST]~OV TOV i\8nvaiwv Kai Tiis ßOVAiis TWV lTEVTaKocriwv .... 
(IsI) Kai CrKpoCraOf.Jal ToD Tc KaTT/yopOIl Kai TOD CrTToAOYOIlf.JtVOIl Of.Jo(GJ) CrWpoiv, 
Kai olaYlT/IPloDf.Jal TTcpi aVTOD 0'; äv rj O(GJ~/) Tj. 
58 AP 61, 1: ... TaVTa Se lTOlT]cr[aVTES Ei]crKaAovcrl TOIlS aywvas, öTav ~ev Ta 
'(Sla [SI] KOl;W<Jl TOIlS iSiovs, T~ apI8~~ S', [eva E]~ [EKO]crTWV [T]WV SIKWV T[W]V EK 
TOV v6~o[v] , K[ali o{tolf.Jvv[ollat}v oi CrvT(OIKOI ci) aVTCJ TlJ TTpäYf.J[al tptiv Lanni 
(2005) 113, (2006) 100 attaches no practical significance to this oath at all. 
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How do we reconcile these oaths with the inconsistent findings 
from the court speeches? Rhodes59 and Lanni60 look for contextual crite-
ria, Le. which of the speaker' s comments are relevant and which are 
not. I posit that the Athenians had a different notion of 'relevance' from 
that of an ob server concemed with today' s law of procedure. The 
Athenians proceeded from the rule of fairness: what pertained "to the 
point" was that which was stated in the written complaint. All of the 
accusations that the accuser wrote down in the enklema and thus dis-
closed to his opponent could be brought up before the dikasterion with-
out the accuser violating his oath. This explains the entire catalogue of 
accusations in Pantainetos' enklema mentioned several times (Dem. 37, 
22-33).61 In Symposion 2003,62 I proved that the 1145 sum demanded by 
Pantainetos, the timema of 2 talents (46),63 was already apparent from 
the first claim, in particular from the twofold doubling of the 30 minae 
(a half talent) that Nikoboulos' slave Antigenes had taken away from 
Pantainetos' slave. All of the other accusations up to the mistreatment 
of heiresses (33) are simply the rhetorical backing for the material de-
mand of the charge. These accusations would be considered ' irrelevant' 
by modem standards. In order to bring these charges into court with-
out reproach by the judges, Pantainetos included every last accusation 
in his enklema. 
Of the remaining complaints or indictments whose wording has 
survived, we do not know if the texts are complete. Dem. 45, 46 is pre-
sumablya complete enklema (including the answer to the charge) from 
a dike pseudomarturiön.64 According to Dionysius of Halicamassus, 
59 Rhodes (2004). 
60 Lanni (2005) 114 
61 Dem 37, 23-33: AEYE 15 ' al/T() TC eYKATllla, ö 1101 !51Ka~ETal. ErKI\HMA. 
"EßAaIl'E IlE NIKOßOVAOS SlTIßOVAEvoas sllol Kai TD ovof~ TU SilD, a<pEAEo8al KEAEV-
oas AVTIYEVTlV TCV saVTOÜ OiKETTlV TC apyvpIOV TOÜ SIlOÜ OiKETOV, Ö e<pEpev Ka-
TaßoAT;v TU TToAEI TOÜ lleTaAAov, ö EYW ETTplallTlV EVEvi]KovTa IlVWV, Kai ahlOS 
Ellol YEVOIlEVOS Eyypa<piival TC !5mAoüv TC;> !5Tllloof~ . ... (§ 25) Kai ETTE1!5i] wcpAOv 
EYW TC;> !5TlIlOof"l', KaTaoTi]oas AVTIYEVTlV TCV EavToü OiKETT)V eis TC EPyaoTi]plov 
TC EIlCV TC ETTI epaovAA~ KVPIOV TWV EIlWV, aTTayopEVOVTOS EIlOÜ .... (§ 26) ... 
KäTTEITa TTEfoas TOVS oiKETas TOVS EIlOVS Ka8E~Eo8al Eis TCV KEyxpewva ETTI ßAaßlJ 
TD EIlD. . .. (§ 28) ... Kai KaTepyaoallevos TT]v apyvpiTlv, T)v oi Ellol oiKETal 
i]pyaoaVTo, Kai exwv TC apyvpIOV TC EK TaVTTlS Tiis apyvpfTl!5oS . .. . (§ 29) ... Kai 
aTTo!56IlEvOS TC EpyaoTi]plov TC EIlCV Kai TOVS oiKETas TTapa TaS ovv8i]Kas, äs 
e8ETo TTPCS IlE. (§ 33, see above n . 47). 
62 Thür (2006) 163f. 
63 See above n. 46. 
64 Dem. 45, 46: ANTlrPA<DH. ATToAA6!5wpos naofwvos Axapvevs ~TEcpav~ 
MEveKAEovs AXaPVEi II'Ev!5ollapTvpfwv, TfllTllla TaAaVTOV. Ta lI'ev!5ii 1l0V Ka-
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Deinarchos 3 mentions the enklema from a dike blabes, which begins in a 
similar manner to Pantainetos'.65 Of the public suits, the eisangelia 
against Alkibiades (Plut. Alk. 22, 3) is composed of several serious re-
proaches for sacrilege of the mysteries.66 The graphe asebeias against Soc-
rates (Diogenes Laertios 2, 40) includes only two accusations, and 
whereas the second one (corrupting the youth) by modem standards 
was lega11y irrelevant, it was perhaps rhetorica11y more dangerous than 
the charge j146 of asebeia.67 The antidosis-petition (graphe) against the 
aged Isokrates (Isokr. 15, 5. 3D), which Harrison did not take into con-
sideration, included a three-tiered claim: 1) the liturgy to be taken over, 
2) the unfair acquisition of income as a logographer, and 3) yet again 
corruption of the youth.68 This last charge has nothing at a11 to do with 
a liturgy in a diadikasia. Even if the historicity of the Antidosis (Isokr. 15) 
is disputed,69 the technical formulation of the graphe seems to me, at 
any rate, to be consistent with actual practice. Another passage not con-
Te~apTVPlloe LTEq>avoS ~apTvp~oas Ta EV Te';) ypa~~aTel~ yeypa~~Eva . 
<LTEq>avoS MeveKAEOVS i\xapveus> TaA1l6ii E~apTVPlloa ~apTvpf]oas Ta EV Te';) 
ypa~~aTel~ yeypa~~Eva . 
65 Dion. HaI. Dein. 3: ... npooKel~Evllv oe EXe1 TT]V ypaq>T]v TaVTT]v' ' ll.elvapxos 
Lc.JOTpaTov KOP1V610S npO~EV~, ctl oVvel~l , ßMßllS TaAavTc.Jv oVo. "EßAa\jJE ~e 
npo~evos, unooe~a~evos eis Ti]v oiKlav TT]V EavTou Ti]v EV aype';), ÖTE TIEq>evyws 
i\6f]v1l6ev Ka-n:1elv EK XaAK(oos, Xpvo(ov ~ev oTaTiipas oyooi]KovTa Kai OlaKoolovS 
Kai nEvTE, OUS EKo~loa EK XaAK(Oos Ei06ToS npO~EVOV Kai eioiiAeov exwv eis TT]V 
oiK(av aVTou, apyvpw~aTa oe OVK EAaTTOV e'{KOOl ~VWV ä~la , EmßovAevoas 
TOVT01S.' 
66 Plut. Alk. 22, 3: ... TT]V ~ev ovv eioayyeA(av OtITc.JS Exovoav avaypacpovOl' 
'8eooaAos Kr~c.Jvos ÄaKlaollS i\AK1ßlaOTlV KAelvlov LKa~ßc.JvlollV eiof]yyelAev 
aOIKeiv TIEpi TW 6ew, [TT]V ll.f]~llTpav Kai Ti]v KOpllV,] anO~I~ov~evov Ta ~voTf]pla 
Kai oelKvvovTa ToiS aUTou halpolS EV Tij oiK1C;X Tij EavTou, ExovTa oToAT]v OlaVTIEp 
o iepocpavTllS EXc.JV oelKvvel Ta iepa, Kai ovo~ar;OvTa aUTov ~ev iepocpavTllv, 
novAvTlwva oe Oc;xooVxov, Kf]pvKa oe 8eooc.Jpov <Dllyalä, TOUS 0' äAAovS ETarpOVS 
~voTas npooayopevovTa Kai EnonTas napa Ta vO~I~a Kai Ta Ka6eoTT]KOTa uno 
T' Eu~oATTlOWV Kai KllPVKc.JV Kai TWV iepEc.JV TWV E~ 'EAevoivos.' 
67 Diog. Laert. 2, 40: 'H 0' aVTc.J~oola Tiis OIKiis TOUTOV eTxe TOV Tponov' ava-
KeiTal yap ETI Kai vuv, CPlloi <Daßc.JpivoS, EV Te';) MllTPc.il~· 'Taoe Eypa\jJaTO Kai 
aVTc.J~ooaTO MEAllTOS MeAf]Tov nlT6eus Lc.JKpaTel Lc.JCPPOVIOKOV i\Ac.JTIEKii6ev· 
a01Kei LWKpaTllS, OUS ~ev ri noA1S VO~Ir;el 6eous ou VO~Ir;c.JV , ETepa oe KalVa 
oal~oVla eiollyov~evos' aOIKei oe Kai TOUS VEOVS 0Iacp6erpc.Jv. TI~ll~a 6avaTOS.' 
68 Isokr. 15, 5: 'Eof]Ac.Joav 0' OÜTc.J olaKel~evol' TOU yap aVTlolKOV TIEpl ~ev wv 
ri KPIOIS Tjv ouoev AEyOVTOS OrKalOv, OlaßaAAovTOS oe TT]V TWV AOyc.JV TWV E~WV 
ovva~IV Kai KaTaAar;ove60~EvoV nepl Te TOU nAouTov Kai TOU nAf]60vs TWV 
~a6TlTwV , eyvc.Joav EjJr,V dval Tr,V ).EITollpy(av. . .. (§ 30) 'EK ~ev TOrVVV Tiis 
ypacpiis TIElpäTar ~e olaßaAAelv 0 KaTi]yopoS, ws 0lacp6elpc.J TOUS vewTEpovS 
AEyelv OloaoKc.JV Kai napa TO OIKalov EV ToiS aywol nAeoveKTeiv, ... 
69 Mirhady / Too (2000) 20lf. 
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sidered by Harrison likewise points in the direction that I have been ar-
guing: Zenothemis proceeded against Protos in a dike emporike with a 
duster of accusations, of which intoxication during a storm at sea 
(Dem. 32, 27)70 could not have been lega11y relevant, regardless of 
whether the type of case, which is in dispute, was a dike blabes or 
exoules,71 In opposition to Lanni72 then, I do not see any essential differ-
ence in the standard of relevance between regular trials and maritime 
cases. In both instances, the accuser anchored his lega11y irrelevant at-
tacks in the enklema. Admittedly, this point does not affect Lanni's ob-
servation that personal invective appears less frequently in maritime 
cases.73 If litigants and witnesses had to tolerate general verbal abuse in 
court, specific attacks were induded in the enklema as a precaution. 
Lanni' s condusion that the obligation to keep to the point was 
strictly observed in murder trials74 is, however, confirmed when taking 
the enklema into account. Here, the enklema is supplanted by the solemn 
oaths sworn by the litigants, the diömosiai. The wording of the oaths still 
conforms to Drako' s homicide law75 and does not a110w for p47 exces-
sive verbiage,76 For this reason, it seems to us today that murder trials 
were conducted more 'fairly' than the rest. 
As a fo11ow up to our discussion of the echinoi, the day jars, which 
in my opinion contained the documents to be read aloud before the di-
kasteria in a11 trials at Athens from the early 4th century on, and of 'rele-
vance', which in my opinion was dosely connected to the wording of 
the charge, let us now return to the lid of the day jar mentioned at the 
outset. 
Scholarly opinion is unanimous that the jar in question can be iden-
tified as an echinos by the inscription that is fragmentarily preserved 
and superimposed with ink. In the second line, the words d]iamarturia 
70 Dem. 32, 27: ... ei IlEV yap ä yiypatpEV OUTOS Eir TO Eyd.mi ETToiel , OVK oq>-
Aeiv äv OiKllV OIKOic.vS, clAA' clTTo6oveiv npWTOS Ellolye oOKei. ei yap EV KOKoi} Koi 
XEIJ.lCJVI ToaovTov oTvov EmvEv c:Ja8' ÖJ.lOIOV dvol J.lOV(r;r, Ti OVK ä~16S EOTI TTo6eiv; Tl 
ei ypaJ.lJ.lOT ' EKAETTTEV, ei Vrrovi~YEV, 
71 Thür (2003) 7lf. 
72 Lanni (2005) 126-128. The requirement of a written contract, Lanni (2006) 
161-166, cannot be discussed here. 
73 Lanni (2005) 127, (2006) 169f. 
74 Lanni (2005) 124-126, (2006) 96-105. 
75 Thür (2004) 36f. 
76 Cf. Ant. 6, 16. 
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and ex anakriseös can be read clearly.77 The case from which it originates 
can easily be explained as a dike pseudomarturiön against a diamarturia 
performed before the archon in an inheritance dispute: a relative of one 
side had petitioned by epidikasia before the archon for the inheritance to 
be assigned; in opposition, a witness was brought forth making the 
claim that "the kleros cannot be assigned (me epidikon einai), because le-
gitimate sons exist."78 The relative challenged this testimony, the dia-
marturia, as false. After that, the archon had to stop the epidikasia and 
conduct an anakrisis conceming the dike pseudomarturiön. Not until the 
relative wins this process, thus after the conviction of the witness, can 
the archon issue the epidikasia; on the other hand, if the legitimate son 
(or sons) is in the right, the estate can be entered into, embateuein, with-
out any official assignment. 
The extant lid then likely comes from the anakrisis of a trial dealing 
with witness testimony; it certainly involves four documents (line I), 
which the accuser (line 4) planned to have read aloud. Along these 
lines, Soritz-Hadler attempted to restore the words that were not pre-
served in the text.79 The first document to be read aloud was the depo-
sition under attack, the diamarturia (line 2). This document of course did 
not come from the anakrisis, but from the epidikasia (the term itself is res-
toration, lines 1/2). Only the three remaining documents co me from the 
anakrisis. They were, as often in Greek document files, submitted in re-
verse chronological order, thus the oldest at the bottom.80 After the dis-
puted diamarturia was read aloud, the charge and the response to it, 
which were recorded together on a document,81 were read out (line 4, 
mostly restoration). For the next document, presumably the accuser 
had submitted a marturia (restored at the end of line 3), most likely fol-
lowed by a nomos, that of mistreatment (kakosis, line 3), which needs to 
be restored at the beginning of line 3. Who was mistreated is uncertain. 
77 I include the text with the restoration by Soritz-Hadler (1986) 106, which, 
in m y opinion, is still quite probable: [eveoTI : Ta]oe : TETTap[a : TW]V : EK [: Tijs 
: 12 ElTIOIKaoias : O]lal . .IOpTVpia : E~ CxvaKpioewS [: P v6~os : ElTlKAi]pW]V KaKwoew[s 
: ~apTVpia : 14 ypa<pal : CxVT]IOi[KWV : name]p: ETIE8[llKev :15 name I" name. The ver-
sion from Boegehold (1982) 4 is again upheld in Boegehold (1995) 81 ; Wall ace (2001) 
92f. sets out aIl versions of the text in a well-arranged format. 
78 See, for example, Dem. 44, 46; this point is dealt with at length by WolH 
(1966) 121-13l. 
79 Soritz-Hadler (1986). 
80 Soritz-Hadler (1986) 106; for documents in reverse chronological order, 
see /PArkp. 93, n. 38. 
81 Cf. the antigraphe in Dem. 45, 46 (above, n. 64). 
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From the speech against Pantainetos, anyhow, it appears that 'mis-
treatment of heiresses' was a potential topic of personal invective.82 1148 
Wall ace vehemently attacked this hypothetical reconstruction of the 
trial and the submitted docurnents, although it is entirely probable 
based on Athenian legal practice. His main argument is 'relevance' 
(which he misunderstood): " ... we have no idea what documents were 
relevant to this particular case."83 He makes the following objection to 
Soritz-Hadler's suggested restoration of a [nomos epiklero]n kaköseös as 
the basis of personal invective:84 " ... would this justify sealing up in the 
echinos the text of an extraneous law?"85 We have seen that, in accor-
dance with the principle of fairness, even the documents that were 
meant to be read aloud in the epilogue and were not pertinent to the 
main issue were disclosed to an opponent in the anakrisis and placed in 
the echinos. A law on kakösis, whether it deals with heiresses [epiklerö]n86 
or, as Wallace suggests, orphans [orphanö]n or parents [goneo]n, is best 
suited to a witness testimony suit against a diamarturia involving in-
heritance issues. Thus, it seems facHe to me to make use of the echinos 
lid for a dubious diamarturia against a graphe, phasis or eisangelia based 
on the word kakoseos alone.87 Wallace not only misunderstood 'rele-
vance', but also did not recognize the 'Neuerungsverbot' associated 
with the echinoi. 
The obligation to speak to the point, which is defined as 'relevant' 
in the written complaint, and to make no substantial accusations be-
yond that, can be attributed to the rule of fairness. But what sanctions 
did a speaker risk if he viola ted this obligation? Lanni does not answer 
this question.88 Neither the court magistrate nor the jurors were al-
lowed to admonish a speaker and eventually make hirn withdraw his 
words. To control the litigants there was, in my opinion, only one ar-
chaic mechanism, the jurors' collective utterance: the spontaneous out-
cry, thorubos.89 The jurors indeed for their part had the obligation to 
82 Dem. 37, 45 (see above n. 46). Soritz-Hadler (1986) 106 (with n. 25) has al-
ready demonstrated this point dearly. 
83 Wallace (2001) 93. 
84 See above n. 82. 
85 Wallace (2001) 95. 
86 Wallace (2001) 95 incorrectly takes exception with the genitive plural, but 
cf. TOIlS V6110VS ... TWV elTlK~dlPc..JV in Dem. 37, 45 (above n. 46). 
87 Wallace (2001) 97. 
88 Lanni (2005) 124, (2006) 98f. remains incondusive. 
89 Bers (1985). The jurors kept a dose watch on the litigants to ensure that 
they kept 'to the point.' The speakers, on the one hand, disguised their own di-
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give both parties an equal hearing,90 but they could let out their heated 
emotions as a group at any time. 
In order to control the 'relevance' of an assertion, then, the jurors 
did not need any knowledge of the law. They simply had to take note 
of the wording of 1149 the enklema and could protest any deviation. In 
order to guarantee the spontaneity of this control mechanism and to 
prevent any disruptions from factions, even the seating in the dikaste-
rion was assigned to the jurors by lot.91 In this way, the external regula-
tions for ensuring equal opportunity and the principle of fairness ob-
served within the speeches go hand-in-hand.92 
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